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Abstract
I argue that information is a goal-relative concept for Bayesians. More
precisely, I argue that how much information (or confirmation) is provided by
a piece of evidence depends on whether the goal is to learn the truth or to
rank actions by their expected utility, and that different confirmation mea-
sures should therefore be used in different contexts. I then show how informa-
tion measures may reasonably be derived from confirmation measures, and I
show how to derive goal-relative non-informative and informative priors given
background information. Finally, I argue that my arguments have important
implications for both objective and subjective Bayesianism. In particular, the
Uniqueness Thesis is either false or must be modified. Moreover, objective
Bayesians must concede that pragmatic factors systematically influence which
priors are rational, and subjective Bayesians must concede that pragmatic
factors sometimes partly determine which prior distribution most accurately
represents an agent’s epistemic state.
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1 Introduction
Suppose you are about to roll a six-sided die (with faces numbered one through six)
and you want a probability distribution that represents how probable each of the
six possible outcomes is.1,2 I have rolled the die many times already, and I tell you
that – on average – the die has landed on 5. Clearly, the die is strongly biased
towards landing on high numbers, and it seems intuitively probable that the die will
land on a high number on the next roll as well. But how do you come up with
precise probabilities for each of the possible outcomes? This is an instance of the
so-called “problem of the priors”: how do you translate background information into
a probability distribution, and – in the absence of background information – how do
you represent a lack of information probabilistically? This paper argues that how
you should answer these questions depends on what goals you have.
More precisely, I will consider two different situations, defined by two different
goals that an agent may have. In the first situation, the goal of the agent is to
learn which hypothesis in a partition of hypotheses is true. In the second situation,
the agent instead intends to use the partition of hypotheses as a predictive tool in
decision making. My arguments will show that these two situations call for different
prior distributions. The implication in the die example is that you need to figure out
why you are interested in the outcome of the die roll before you can figure out which
1I wish to thank Malcolm Forster, Jan Sprenger, Reuben Stern, and the FEW 2016 referees for
reading a version of the paper. I also wish to thank the FEW audience, and especially mycommen-
tator, Kenny Easwaran. I also thank the referees for helpful comments.
2This example is originally due to E. T. Jaynes (see, e.g., Jaynes (1989)). For an extended
critical discussion, see Seidenfeld (1986). Although the example is clearly highly artificial, it is
structurally similar to many real scientific examples.
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prior probability you should use.3
The arguments of the paper have important implications for both objective and
subjective Bayesians. In particular, the Uniqueness Thesis for priors, which is a
prominent thesis among objective Bayesians according to which there is a uniquely
rational prior given any background information, is either false or must be modified.
Moreover, objective Bayesians must concede that pragmatic factors systematically
influence which probability distribution is most rational. Subjective Bayesians, on
the other hand, must concede that pragmatic factors sometimes in part determine
which probability distribution most faithfully represents an agent’s epistemic state.
2 Notation and the Basics of Bayesianism
A few notational remarks are in order. First, I will generally use H to refer to a
partition of hypotheses (i.e. a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses),
and I will use Hj to refer to some arbitrary member in the partition. Similarly, I
will generally use E to refer to a partition of possible evidence and Ei to refer to
some element in the partition. However, if I am explicitly discussing a continuous
hypothesis space (i.e. a hypothesis space that is indexed by a real-valued parameter),
then I will use Θ to refer to a partition of hypotheses, θ to refer to some hypothesis
in the partition, X to refer to a partition of possible evidence, and x to refer to an
element of the partition. Generally, sums over all the elements in a partition will
be denoted by
∑
i or
∑
j, unless the sum is over a continuous space, in which case
integrals will be used instead.
3I return to the die example in Section 8.
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The basic problem in Bayesian inference is to infer the true, predictively accurate,
or otherwise useful hypotheses in H given some particular observation E. Bayesians
solve this problem by using Bayes’s theorem. Bayes’s theorem requires two ingre-
dients: a prior probability function and a likelihood function. A prior probability
function is a probability distribution p over H that is supposed to represent how
probable each Hj is prior to any evidence. For ease of notation, I will sometimes
use p(H) to refer to the set of probabilities p(H1), p(H2), . . . , p(Hn) over the par-
tition H. The fact that p is a probability distribution means that we require that∑
j p(Hj) = 1. A likelihood function, p(E|Hj), is a function that says how probable
each Hj makes the observation E.
Once we have a prior and a likelihood, Bayes’s theorem says that p(Hj|E) =
cp(Hj)p(E|Hj).4 To a Bayesian, p(H|E) is the new probability that we ought to
assign to H in light of having observed E.
3 The Importance of Information Measures for
Bayesianism
An “information measure” is a quantitative measure of how “informative” or “opin-
ionated” a probability distribution is.5 The most well known information measure
is the Shannon entropy, which says that the information content in p(H) is given
by −∑j p(Hj) log p(Hj). The higher the Shannon entropy, the less informative and
less opinionated is the probability distribution. The probability distribution with
4Here c = 1/
∑
j p(E|Hj)p(Hj).
5In this paper I will use “informative” and “opinionated” interchangeably.
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the highest Shannon entropy is the “flat” distribution that assigns the same prob-
ability to every hypothesis in H. Intuitively the flat distribution is indeed the least
informative and least opinionated probability distribution since it does not favor any
hypothesis in H over any other. On the other hand, the distribution over H that
has the lowest Shannon entropy and is therefore the most informative is the distri-
bution that assigns all its probability mass to one of the hypotheses. This also seems
intuitively reasonable. Indeed, we may view it as a sanity check on any proposed
information measure that the measure deem a probability distribution that assigns
all its probability to a single hypothesis maximally opinionated, and that it deem
the flat probability distribution minimally opinionated.6
But what about all the other probability distributions in between the maximally
and minimally opinionated ones? Here intuition often comes up short. Let’s say we
are considering distributions over a partition of three hypotheses. Is a distribution
that assigns probabilities of 0.2, 0.3 and 0.5 to the three hypotheses more or less
opinionated than a distribution that assigns 0.15, 0.4, and 0.45? This may seem like
an esoteric question, but the answer to the question is of crucial importance, and is
sensitive to the choice of information measure.
The reason why this question is of crucial importance to so-called “objective
Bayesians” is clear. According to most objective Bayesians a probability distribution
is rational for an agent if and only if the distribution is maximally non-informative
relative to the agent’s background knowledge; thus, objective Bayesians explicitly
need an information measure in order to evaluate how informative various candidate
6This sanity check only makes sense when the hypothesis space is finite. Matters are subtler
when the hypothesis space is continuous, as we shall see later.
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probability distributions are.
That information measures are also crucially important to subjective Bayesians is
probably a more contentious claim. I defer a more thorough discussion of this issue
to Section 9.2, since my discussion will rely on developments made in the paper.
However, the reason why information measures are also important to subjective
Bayesians can be put briefly as follows. Subjective Bayesians hold that an agent’s
probability distribution should accurately represent the agent’s epistemic state. Since
most of us do not have numerical probabilities in our heads, this introduces a kind
translation problem, because agents’ subjective degrees of confidence must somehow
be translated into numbers. How this translation problem should be solved will
sometimes depend on what the goals of the agent are and what the correspondingly
suitable information measure is.
4 Other Approaches to Measuring Information
Many information measures have been proposed in the statistical and information
theory literatures.7 Which of these many information measures is appropriate for
Bayesian purposes? Most Bayesians who have thought about this issue have endorsed
the aforementioned Shannon information measure. As was pointed out previously,
the Shannon entropy has the intuitively appealing feature of declaring the flat distri-
bution maximally uninformative and the distribution that assigns all its probability
to a single hypothesis maximally informative. However, there are many other infor-
7Including two (infinitely) large classes of information measures, the Re´nyi measures (Re´nyi,
1961) and the Tsallis measures (Tsallis, 1988) .
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mation measures that also have this feature,8 so why go for the Shannon entropy
rather than one of these other measures?
The standard arguments in favor of Shannon’s information measure have nothing
in particular to do with Bayesian inference,9 and it is therefore unclear why Bayesians
should care about these arguments.
For example, one of the standard postulates used to derive Shannon’s informa-
tion measure holds that the information content of a probability distribution should
decrease as the number of hypotheses increases, all else being equal. This postulate
has dubious relevance to Bayesian inference, however, because in Bayesian analyses
the hypothesis space is almost always held fixed throughout the analysis. And even
if we do demand that our information measure satisfy this requirement, there are
many information measures that satisfy it aside from Shannon entropy.
Indeed, in the traditional argument for Shannon’s information measure, the only
property that distinguishes Shannon’s measure from a whole slew of other informa-
tion measures is that it has a certain additivity property (Re´nyi, 1961). Although
it may make sense to require this additivity property in the original communication
theory context in which Shannon information was introduced, it’s not clear why an
information measure needs to have the property in the context of Bayesian inference.
Some Bayesians have taken a more radical and pluralist approach to information
measures. For example, Morris DeGroot (1962) defines “the value of information”
8Including all Re´nyi and Tsallis measures.
9A notable exception is Jon Williamson (2010), who uses an argument based on Bayesian scoring
rules. However, below I will argue that the scoring rule he relies on is only appropriate in what
I call the “learning” situation, where the goal is to identify the true hypothesis in a partition of
hypotheses.
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as the difference that a piece of evidence makes to the expected utility calculation of
an agent. This definition is used by Bernardo (1981) to define “minimally valuable”
priors. However, the “minimally valuable” prior is often not the flat distribution and
is sometimes even the probability function that assigns all its probability mass to a
single hypothesis. Hence, whatever the “minimally valuable” prior is supposed to
be, it should not be interpreted as the prior that is maximally uninformative,10 and
DeGroot’s measure is therefore not an appropriate measure of the informativeness
of probability functions, since the measure clearly fails the previously mentioned
sanity checks. The reason DeGroot’s measure gives unintuitive results is because the
measure depends on the utility function of the agent.
The approach advocated here is intermediate between the preceding two ap-
proaches. I do not think information measures should be functionally dependent on
agents’ utilities, but I also do not think a single measure of information is appropriate
in all contexts, nor do I think arguments for information measures should proceed in
a complete vacuum from the contexts in which the information measures will play a
role. In particular, in a Bayesian context, the prior and the posterior probabilities
of a hypothesis are the fundamental quantities that represent how probable the hy-
pothesis is prior to and after the observation of evidence, respectively. Since evidence
is the conveyer of information, the starting point of my argument is the following
foundational observation about information in a Bayesian context:
Observation Given some hypothesis H and evidence E, the posterior,
p(H|E) is more informed than the prior, p(H)
10It is not clear Bernardo (1981) would have endorsed such an interpretation either.
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That the posterior probability is more informed than the prior seems to me to
be a truism, but the question now arises of how much more informed the posterior
is when compared to the prior.
5 Confirmation Measures as Measures of the In-
formativeness of Data
In general, a measure of the distance between the posterior and prior probability of
a hypothesis given a piece of evidence is known as a “confirmation measure.” Here, I
will follow convention and use c(H,E) to refer to the confirmation score of H given E
according to some unspecified confirmation measure. Additionally, two specific con-
firmation measures will play a particularly important role. The difference measure,
d(H,E), measures the degree of confirmation that E confers on H as p(H|E)−p(H).
The log-ratio measure, lr(H,E), measures the degree of confirmation as log p(H|E)
p(H)
.
Note that both the difference measure and the log-ratio measure have the property
that 0 signifies that E confers no confirmation on H.
Importantly for our purposes, confirmation measures may naturally be inter-
preted as quantitative measures of how much information a piece of evidence pro-
vides with respect to a hypothesis.11 For example, if c(H,E) is a large number (either
positive or negative), then that means that E provides us with a lot of information
about H, since H greatly changes the probability of H; if, on the other hand, c(H,E)
11That confirmation measures may be interpreted in this way is not to deny that they may also be
interpreted in other ways. For example, one prominent strand of confirmation theory (e.g. Crupi
and Tentori (2013)) regards confirmation as a generalization of logical entailment. I thank Jan
Sprenger for emphasizing this to me.
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is 0, then E provides us with no information about H.
It is immediately clear that different confirmation measures will in general dis-
agree on how informative a given datum is, and sometimes the extent of disagreement
can be extreme. For example, a change from Pr(H) = 0.00001 to Pr(H|E) = 0.01
is trivial compared to a change from 0.5 to 0.6 if we use the difference measure; but
according to the log-ratio measure, the first change is much greater than the second.
How informative E is with respect to H therefore depends on which confirmation
measure is used.
The argument put forward here will be that the appropriate way to measure the
distance between the posterior and the prior probability of a hypothesis depends
on the goals of the agent. Thus, for example, whether the difference between a
probability of 0.01 and a probability 0.1 is “big” or “small” depends on pragmatic
factors. I will consider two more specific goals that an agent may have in order to
demonstrate the point.
5.1 The Learning Situation and the Log-Ratio Measure
In the first situation I consider – let’s call it the “learning situation” – the goal is
to identify which hypothesis, H, in a partition of hypotheses, H, is true. Translated
into the Bayesian framework, the goal is for the posterior probability of the true
hypothesis, H0, to be as large as possible. Ideally, we want p(H0|E) = 1. Given that
this is the goal, what is the best way to measure the extent to which E informs us
about some H in H?
One way to make the goal more explicit is by creating a “scoring rule” that
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more precisely encodes what our epistemic values are in the learning situation. A
“scoring rule” is a function of the form s(p,H0), where H0 is the true hypothesis
in the partition H. The score of p is supposed to represent how well p achieves our
goals. The defining feature of the learning situation is that we want to assign as much
probability to H0 as possible. A reasonable way to formalize this goal is to require
that a probability function, p, receive a higher score than a different probability
function, q, if and only if p(H0) > q(H0).
A scoring rule that ranks p as better than q if and only if p assigns the truth
a higher probability than does q is sometimes known in the literature as a “local”
scoring rule. Such scoring rules are “local” because the probabilities that p and
q assign to false hypotheses are irrelevant to which probability function receives a
higher score.12 Sometimes we do care about how inaccurate our probabilities in false
hypotheses are, and in those cases locality is a bad requirement to make of our scoring
rule. However, locality is a very reasonable requirement to make of a scoring rule
in the learning situation, because in the learning situation the objective is precisely
and only to identify the truth.
Out of the well-known and independently plausible scoring rules, the only local
scoring rule is the log scoring rule, which assigns a score of log p(H0) to p. In fact, the
log-scoring rule is the only local scoring rule that is strictly proper (Bernardo, 1979a),
which is a property that many philosophers have argued any reasonable scoring rule
ought to have (see, e.g. Oddie (1997), Gibbard (2007), Joyce (2009), and Horowitz
(2014)). The log-scoring rule is therefore a reasonable scoring rule in the learning
12Clearly, in practice we often do care about which probabilities we assign to false hypothesis, so
the learning situation, as characterized here, describes a somewhat idealized epistemic goal.
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situation: it appropriately encodes the epistemic goal of learning the truth. Note
that this does not mean that the log-scoring rule is the uniquely rational scoring rule
in the learning situation.
As Steven van Enk (2014) points out in a recent paper, there is a clear connection
between scoring rules and confirmation measures. More precisely, the extent to which
E confirms (or disconfirms) a hypothesis H can also naturally be understood as the
extent to which E changes the score of p(H), on the assumption that H is true. The
idea is that the scoring rule assigns an epistemic value to the posterior and to the
prior, and the difference in score is therefore the difference that the evidence makes
to the epistemic value of the hypothesis.
In the learning context, the epistemic value is to learn the truth, so the difference
in log-score between p(H|E) and p(H) is therefore the difference that the evidence
makes to the goal of learning whether H is true. If we measure this difference by
taking the arithmetic difference, we end up with the log-ratio measure of confirma-
tion:
log p(H|E)− log p(H) = lr(H,E). (5.1)
Thus, we get the conclusion that the log-ratio measure is a reasonable measure of
the informativeness of evidence in the learning situation, where the goal is to learn
whether H is true.13
13Why measure the difference between the log-score of the posterior and the prior using the
arithmetic difference rather than, say, the ratio, log p(H|E)log p(H) ? Of course, we could use the ratio
instead of the difference, but the resulting confirmation measure is not independently plausible, in
contrast to the familiar log-ratio measure. In any case, I am not claiming that the formal choices I
make here and other places in the paper are uniquely reasonable, but only that they are reasonable.
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The above argument is not intended to be a knock-down argument for the log-
ratio measure of confirmation; the argument is only intended to show that the log-
ratio measure is reasonable in the learning situation, where the goal is to identify the
true hypothesis in a partition of hypotheses. Indeed, although the log-ratio measure
is reasonable in the learning situation, it is not reasonable in all other situations; in
the next subsection, I consider a different situation where the log-ratio measure is
not reasonable, while another confirmation measure is.
5.2 The Decision Situation and the Difference Measure
Our goal is not always to find the truth; sometimes the goal is to make a good
decision. Thus the second situation I will consider is the “decision situation.” In
the traditional Bayesian formalization of the decision situation, there is a preference
ranking over a partition of various states Sm that the world may be in, and there is
also a partition of possible available acts An ranked by their expected utility. For
example, Sm may represent hypotheses about how much it is going to rain in the
next hour, and An may represent how far away from home we are willing to venture
without an umbrella.
For simplicity, I will assume in this paper that the acts and states are independent
according to p.14 More importantly, I will also assume that the utility function does
not depend on p or on possible evidence.15 The “prior” expected utility of some act
14When the acts and states are not independent, there is some controversy over which Bayesian
decision theory is the correct one. Some endorse Causal Decision Theory (e.g. Lewis (1981), Pearl
(2009), and Joyce (2009)), while others endorse Evidential Decision Theory (e.g. Jeffrey (1983),
Eells (1991), and Ahmed (2012).
15Hence, the utility function is not a scoring rule in the sense of the previous section. The learning
situation as I presented it in the previous section may also be regarded as a kind of decision problem,
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An is then defined
16 as:
EU(An) =
∑
m
p(Sm)U(Sm&An) (5.2)
Here, U(Sm&An) is the utility of performing An when Sm obtains. For example,
going on a long walk without an umbrella when it rains a lot has a low utility for
me, but going on a long walk without an umbrella when it’s sunny has a high utility.
Now suppose we also have available a partition of hypotheses, H, that can be used
to predict whether Sm will obtain. For example, H may be hypotheses about what the
barometric pressure will be in the next hour. Clearly, if we knew what the barometric
pressure H0 would be in the next hour, then we could use that information to predict
how much it would rain using the conditional probability p(Sm|H0). Unfortunately,
we don’t know what the barometric pressure is going to be, so we need to put a prior
probability over H, p(Hj), that represents the probability of each of the possible
values the barometric pressure can take in the next hour. Once we have this prior
distribution, we can use the Hj’s to predict the Sm’s by using the law of total
probability:
p(Sm) =
∑
j
p(Sm|Hj) ∗ p(Hj) (5.3)
Now, suppose we wanted to use a scoring rule to evaluate the prior probability
distribution over H. Is the log-scoring rule appropriate in this context? By assump-
but it is important to realize that it is a qualitatively very different decision problem from the kind
of decision problem considered in this section, because the utility function (i.e. the scoring rule) in
the learning situation depends on the agent’s probability function and on the data.
16Following Savage (1954).
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tion, we do not really care about what the true value of the barometric pressure is;
what we care about is how much it will rain in the next hour. The hypotheses about
barometric pressure are therefore for us mere predictive tools. Clearly, if the goal
is to use the Hj’s to predict which Sm is going to obtain, then we want to assign
high probabilities to predictively accurate hypotheses (irrespective of whether they
are true) and low probabilities to predictively inaccurate hypotheses. The true hy-
pothesis only has a special status insofar as it can be expected to have the highest
predictive accuracy. But a probability function that assigns a high probability to
the truth will not be good for predictive purposes if it also assigns high probabili-
ties to hypotheses that are very predictively inaccurate, and, moreover, it will not
be better than a probability function that assigns a low (even 0) probability to the
truth, but at the same time only assigns high probabilities to predictively accurate
hypotheses. But this means that a local scoring rule, such as the log-scoring rule, is
inappropriate, because a local scoring rule scores probability functions only by the
probabilities that they assign to the truth.
In particular, in the prediction of Sm (i.e. formula (5.3)), each Hj is in a sense
equally important because each Hj is used in the weighted prediction, so a non-local
scoring rule that takes into account the probability assigned to every hypothesis
in the partition seems much more appropriate. The most well known non-local
scoring rule that does this is the quadratic scoring rule, which assigns a score of∑
j (i(Hj)− p(Hj))2 to p, where i(Hj) is the indicator function that assigns 1 to
Hj if Hj is true and 0 otherwise. The quadratic scoring rule therefore seems more
appropriate than the log-scoring rule for the purpose of evaluating our prior over H
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in the decision situation, where H is used as a predictive tool. Moreover, as van
Enk (2014) shows, the standard confirmation measure that is associated with the
quadratic scoring rule is the difference measure. Hence we get the conclusion that
the difference measure, and not the log-ratio measure, is a reasonable measure of the
informativeness of evidence in the decision situation.
The above argument is rather sketchy, so here is a more detailed analysis that
shows how the difference measure of confirmation naturally arises in the decision sit-
uation. First, note that we can plug (5.2) into (5.1) in order to make the dependence
of the expected utility of An on Hj explicit:
EU(An) =
∑
m
∑
j
p(Sm|Hj)p(Hj)U(Sm&An) (5.4)
Next, suppose we receive evidence regarding which hypothesis in H is true in the
form of data E; for example E may be data about the barometric pressure from two
hours ago. What the barometric pressure was two hours ago is clearly relevant to
what the barometric pressure will be in the next hour, so if we are good Bayesians,
we will update each prior p(Hj) to a posterior p(Hj|E) to take into account this new
information. If we do, then the new “posterior” expected utility of An is:
EU(An|E) =
∑
m
∑
j
p(Sm|Hj, E)p(Hj|E)U(Sm&An) (5.5)
Here, p(Sm|Hj, E) represents the probability that it will rain Sm millimeters in
the next hour, given that the barometric pressure in the next hour is Hj and the
barometric pressure two hours ago was E. It is natural to assume here and in many
16
other similar cases that E does not give us any information about Sm except insofar
as E provides us with information about Hj.That is, it is natural to assume that
p(Sm|Hj, E) = p(Sm|Hj).17 If we make this assumption, then the posterior expected
utility of An is simply:
EU(An|E) =
∑
m
∑
j
p(Sm|Hj)p(Hj|E)U(Sm&An) (5.6)
Now, if we take the difference between the posterior expected utility of An and
the prior expected utility of An, we arrive at the following expression:
∆EU(An;E) = EU(An|E)−EU(An) =
∑
i
∑
j
p(Si|Hj)[p(Hj|E)− p(Hj)]U(Si&Aj)
(5.7)
Or, in other words,
∆EU(An;E) =
∑
i
∑
j
p(Si|Hj)d(Hj,E)U(Si&Aj) (5.8)
Here, d(Hj, E) is the confirmation conferred on Hj by E according to the differ-
ence measure p(Hj|E)− p(Hj). Again, the above expressions may look complicated,
but the important thing to note is that the difference between the posterior and prior
expected utility of An depends on the data only through d(Hj, E). In the decision
situation, we do not care about which Hj is true; we only care about Hj insofar as it
can help us predict Sm and thereby influence our preference ranking over An. Clearly
17As has been pointed out to me by Reuben Stern, this assumption does not always hold, but it
holds very widely.
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the only way our preference ranking can change given x is if ∆EU(An;E) is non-zero
for some An. But ∆EU(An;E) depends on the data only through d(Hj, E); hence,
in the decision situation, d(Hj, E) arises as a natural measure of the informativeness
of E with respect to Hn.
But why use the arithmetic difference between the posterior and prior expected
utility to measure the impact that E has on the expected utility of An? Isn’t that
a circular way of arguing in favor of the difference measure? Why not use, say, the
ratio instead?
One answer to this objection18 is that we do not really have a choice, because
the ratio between two expected utilities will in general not be a meaningful quan-
tity. This is because utility functions are usually only defined up to arbitrary linear
transformations. In other words, if U is the utility function of some agent, then
aU + b is usually an equally valid representation of the agent’s utilities, for any real
number b and positive real number a. For instance, Savage’s (1954) famous repre-
sentation theorem, and its various descendants, only define the utility function up to
arbitrary positive linear transformations. As a result of this, utilities and expected
utilities exist on an interval scale (Stevens, 1946). But this means that the ratio of
two utilities is not meaningful, because the ratio will change if you transform the
utility scale with an arbitrary positive linear transformation. As an analogy, celsius
and fahrenheit are interval scale measurements of temperature: it is meaningful to
say that the difference between 5 and 10 degrees celsius is the same as the difference
between 15 and 20 degrees celsius, because these differences remain equal if they are
18I will say a bit more about it in the next section.
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both transformed to the fahrenheit scale. However, it is not meaningful to say that
10 degrees celsius is “twice as large” as 5 degrees celsius, because the ratio between
these temperatures changes if the temperatures are transformed to the fahrenheit
scale.
5.3 Numerical Examples Showing Why the Learning and
Decision Situations Require Different Measures of Con-
firmation
Neither of the preceding subsections is intended to offer a knock-down argument;
the argument in subsection 5.1 merely shows the log-ratio measure to be an espe-
cially reasonable confirmation measure in the learning situation, and the argument
in subsection 5.2 just shows the difference measure to be especially reasonable in the
decision situation. Furthermore, the arguments may appear rather abstract. Simple
numerical examples help illustrate and independently bolster the claim that the de-
cision situation and the learning situation call for different confirmation/information
measures.
In particular, suppose you have just two hypotheses, H and ¬H and consider two
different scenarios: in the first scenario, the probability of H changes from 0.0001 to
0.1001; in the second scenario, the probability of H instead changes from 0.4 to 0.5.
Which of these changes is more informative?
Suppose, first, that you are in the learning situation, so that your goal is to figure
out which of H or ¬H is true. According to the odds version of Bayes’s formula,
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p(H|E)
p(¬H|E) =
p(E|H)
p(E|¬H)
p(H)
p(¬H) (5.9)
Thus, if the probability of H changes from 0.0001 to 0.1001, then p(E|H)
p(E|¬H) = 1111.
If, on the other hand, the probability of H changes from 0.4 to 0.5, then by the same
calculation, p(E|H)
p(E|¬H) = 1.5. Thus, the change from 0.0001 to 0.1001 requires that H
predict the evidence much better than ¬H, whereas the change from 0.4 to 0.5 does
not.
Let’s make the example more vivid by providing some concrete numbers. Suppose
¬H assigns E a probability of 0.0009 and that H assigns E a probability of 0.9999,
and suppose E is observed. Intuitively, the observation of E very strongly suggests
that H is true and that ¬H is false because ¬H’s prediction was that E was basically
impossible whereas H predicted that E was almost sure to happen. Under these
conditions, if H’s prior probability is 0.0001, then H’s posterior will be 0.1001. Thus,
the difference between 0.0001 and 0.1001 is actually extremely large in this context.
Suppose, on the other hand, that H assigns E a probability of 0.9 and that ¬H
assigns E a probability of 0.6, and suppose again that E is observed. In this scenario,
the observation of E only weakly suggests that H rather than ¬H is true. H and
¬H both predicted E as more likely than not, and both also assigned ¬E a fairly
high probability. Under these conditions, if H’s prior probability probability is 0.4,
then H’s posterior probability will be 0.5. Hence the difference between 0.4 and 0.5
is not very large in this context.
This numerical example, which has nothing to do with scoring rules and there-
fore provides an argument independent of the one provided in the subsection (5.2),
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strongly suggests that the change from 0.0001 to 0.1001 is much more informative
regarding H’s truth value than is the change from 0.4 to 0.5. This is exactly the
verdict delivered by the log-ratio measure.19. The difference measure, on the other
hand, says that these changes in probability are equally informative, which does not
seem reasonable.
But now suppose you are instead in the decision situation, and suppose you are
calculating the expected utility of some action A. Then, as the following calculation
shows, the change in the expected utility of A is the same whether the probability
of H changes from 0.0001 to 0.1001 or from 0.4 to 0.5. For suppose first that the
probability of H changes from 0.0001 to 0.1001. Then:
∆EU(A;E) =
∑
m
p(Sm|H)U(Sm&A)
[
p(H|E)− p(H)]+∑
m
p(Sm|¬H)U(Sm&A)
[
p(¬H|E)− p(¬H)]
(5.10)
=
∑
m
p(Sm|H)U(Sm&A)
[
0.1001− 0.0001]+∑
m
p(Sm|¬H)U(Sm&a)
[
0.8999− 0.999]
(5.11)
=
∑
m
p(Sm|H)U(Sm&A) ∗ 0.1−
∑
m
p(Sm|¬H)U(Sm&A) ∗ 0.1 (5.12)
Suppose, on the other hand, that the probability of H changes from 0.4 to 0.5;
then the change in the expected utility of A is,
19Of course, other confirmation measures also deliver this verdict, such as the log-likelihood ratio,
for example. The argument presented here therefore does not single out – and is not intended to
single out – the log-ratio confirmation measure as better than all other confirmation measures;
the argument only establishes the log-ratio measure of confirmation as a reasonable measure of
confirmation.
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∆EU(A;E) =
∑
m
p(Sm|H)U(Sm&A)
[
0.5− 0.4]+∑
m
p(Sm|¬H)U(Sm&a)
[
0.5− 0.6]
(5.13)
=
∑
m
p(Sm|H)U(Sm&A) ∗ 0.1−
∑
m
p(Sm|¬H)U(Sm&A) ∗ 0.1 (5.14)
The fact that (5.12) to (5.14) are identical implies that the change in the expected
utility of A is the same whether the probability of H changes from 0.0001 to 0.1001
or from 0.4 to 0.5. Thus, in this context, a change in probability from 0.4 to 0.5 is
exactly as informative as a change in probability from 0.0001 to 0.1001. And this is
the verdict delivered by the difference measure.
On the other hand, the log-ratio measure is not a reasonable measure of in-
formativeness in the decision situation. In fact, for every  > 0, no matter how
small, and every B > 0, no matter how large, it is easy to come up with examples20
such that the degree of confirmation (or disconfirmation) conferred by E accord-
ing the log-ratio measure is greater than B, while at the same time, for every n,
|E(An;E) − E(An)| <  and |E(An;E)/E(An) − 1| < , i.e. the difference that E
makes to the expected utility of every action under consideration is arbitrarily small,
regardless of whether you measure the impact that E has on the expected utility
ranking of actions as a difference or as a ratio.
Arguably, in the decision situation, where what you care about is the expected
utility ranking of the actions under consideration, it does not make sense to say that
20For reasons of space, I will omit the details here.
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E provides you with a lot of information if E has essentially no influence on the
expected utility of any action. But that is what you have to say if you measure
informational impact with the log-ratio measure. The log-ratio measure is therefore
not a reasonable measure of informativeness in the decision situation.
6 How to Derive Information Measures From Con-
firmation Measures
So far, I’ve argued that how informative a piece of evidence is depends on the goal.
In the learning situation, the informativeness of E with respect to H is reasonably
quantified by the log-ratio measure, whereas the difference measure is not reasonable.
However, in the decision situation, the informativeness of E with respect to H is
reasonably quantified by the difference measure, whereas the log-ratio measure is
not reasonable.
However, the ultimate goal of the paper is to show that how much information
there is in a probability distribution depends on how the probability distribution
will be used. The next goal of the paper is therefore to show how information
measures may reasonably be derived from confirmation measures. As before, I do
not claim that the formal choices made are uniquely rational: I only claim that
they are reasonable. There may be other reasonable ways of deriving information
measures from confirmation measures, but the point will still stand that the decision
situation and the learning situation call for different information measures because
they call for different confirmation measures.
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6.1 How to Extend a Confirmation Measure to a Partition
of Hypotheses, or: How to Measure the Information
Distance Between the Prior and Posterior Distributions
A confirmation measure tells us how informative E is with respect to some particular
Hj in H. Of course, E will have an impact on each Hj in the partition. How may we
quantify the effect that E has on the partition overall? Or, to put the same question
in somewhat different terms, how do we measure the “information distance” between
the whole posterior distribution and the whole prior distribution? One way to do so
is to simply add up all the individual confirmation scores,
∑
j c(Hj, E), for each Hj
in the partition. This implicitly weighs each confirmation score as equally significant.
An alternative approach that is more appealing from a Bayesian perspective is to
weigh each term in the sum using either the prior or the posterior. Since the poste-
rior is more well-informed than the prior, it makes more sense to use the posterior
than the prior. Following this idea leads us to quantify the impact of E on H as∑
j c(Hj, E)p(Hj|E).
Plugging in various confirmation measures for c yields different measures of the
information distance between the posterior distribution and the prior distribution.
For example, plugging in the log-ratio confirmation measure for c yields the well
known Kullback-Leibler divergence (Kullback and Leibler, 1951), which lends further
credence to the idea that
∑
j c(Hj, E)p(Hj|E) is a reasonable general measure of the
information distance between the posterior and the prior. Quantifying the impact of
E on H in this way is also endorsed by Crupi and Tentori (2014).
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Thus, I contend, the following is a reasonable (though not necessarily uniquely
reasonable) quantification of the information distance between the prior distribution
and the posterior distribution, given some piece of evidence E:
The information distance between the posterior and the prior distribution.
Given a confirmation measure c, a piece of evidence E, and a probability function
p, the information distance between the prior distribution p(H) and the posterior
distribution p(H|E) is defined as follows:
InfDis(p(H|E), p(H)) =
∑
j
c(Hj, E) ∗ p(Hj|E) (6.1)
(6.1) tells us the information distance between p and the posterior given some
particular Ek in E. Different Ek’s will, of course, result in different posteriors. Be-
fore we receive the evidence, how much evidence can we expect to receive from E?
Or, put differently, how much information – on average – will E provide us about
H? A reasonable way to quantify the answer to this question is to simply average
InfDis(p(H|E), p(H)) over the partition E (again, this is also suggested by Crupi
and Tentori (2014)):
InfDis(p(H|E), p(H)) =
∑
i
InfDis(p(H|E), p(H)) ∗ p(Ei) (6.2)
(6.2) tells us how much information, on average, the partition of evidence E can
be expected to provide us about the partition of hypotheses H. A trick due to Jose
Bernardo (1979) is now all we need in order to derive information measures.21
21I emphasize that my interpretation of Bernardo’s trick differs significantly from Bernardo’s own.
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6.2 How to Define Information Measures From Measures of
the Information Distance Between the Posterior and the
Prior Distribution
More precisely, a prior is intuitively non-informative to the extent that it is distant
from most posteriors that are heavily influenced by data. To formalize this idea,
imagine that we are going to receive a large amount of evidence E1,E2, . . . . . .En. As
the amount of evidence increases (n→∞), the posterior distribution will gradually
become increasingly informed by the evidence, and in the limit of infinite evidence,
the posterior distribution will be maximally informed and maximally opinionated;
that is, some hypothesis (we do not know which one) will have a probability of 1.22
A prior distribution is then non-informative in proportion to how informationally
distant, on average, it will be from the maximally informative posterior distribution,
whatever the maximally posterior distribution turns out to be. Using the definition of
InfDis (6.2), we can formally quantify the preceding ideas, and define the information
content of the prior distribution, p(H), as follows:
Inf(p) = lim
n→∞
InfDis(p(H|En), p(H)) (6.3)
It is very important to note that we do not need an actual sequence of evidence in
order to make sense of (6.3). The imagined sequence of evidence, E1,E2, . . . . . .En,
merely functions as a way of formalizing the idea that the posterior gets increasingly
For more faithful presentations of Bernardo’s views, see Bernardo (1979b), Berger et al. (2009), or
Sprenger (2012).
22Well known convergence results guarantee that the probability distribution will converge under
widely applicable conditions (see, e.g. Hawthorne (manuscript)).
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informed as more evidence comes in. The derivation in Appendix A shows that,
when the hypothesis space is finite, properties of the sequence of imagined evidence
(e.g. the distribution of the evidence) do not make a difference to the information
content of Pr(H).23
If we plug (6.1) and (6.2) into (6.3), we get the following alternative expression for
Inf(p), which makes the dependence on the choice of confirmation measure explicit:
Inf(p) = lim
n→∞
∑
i
∑
j
c(Hj, E
n
i ) ∗ p(Hj, Eni ) (6.4)
Now we can plug different confirmation measures into (6.4) and get different in-
formation measures. In the case of a finite hypothesis space, it is actually possible to
explicitly calculate (6.4) for several well known confirmation measures, and in partic-
ular for the difference measure and the log-ratio measure. More precisely, if we plug
in the difference measure and the log-ratio measure, respectively, and perform the
relevant calculations, we arrive at the following two alternative information measures
(see Appendix A for the derivations):
The lr information measure. Given p defined on a finite hypothesis space, {Hi},
23When the hypothesis space is continuous, the situation is a bit more subtle—in this case, the
information content depends on the statistical model in which the hypotheses are situated. But this
is reasonable because, in the continuous case, the hypotheses are generally indexed by continuous
parameters, and it is those parameters that must be assigned probabilities. Moreover, the meaning
of a parameter generally depends on the statistical model of which it is a part. For example, the
parameter B in the linear model Bx + C picks out the slope of a line; but in the quadratic model
Ax2 +Bx+C, B does not pick out the slope of a line. Thus, it is not strange that the information
content of Pr(B should depend on which statistical model B is embedded in.
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The information content of p according to the log-ratio measure is defined as,
Inf lr(p) = −
∑
p(Hi) log p(Hi) (6.5)
The d information measure. Given p defined on a finite hypothesis space, {Hi},
The information content of p according to the difference measure is defined as,
Infd(p) = 1−
∑
p(Hi)
2 (6.6)
Both of the above information measures have a long and rich history, and it is
both surprising and interesting in its own right that these measures have such a
close connection with Bayesian measures of confirmation. −∑ p(Hi) log p(Hi) is the
Shannon information of p (Shannon, 1948), which has been defended as a measure
of the non-informativeness of probability functions by, among others, Edwin Jaynes
(2003) and Jon Williamson (2010). 1 − ∑ p(Hi)2 is known to ecologists as the
Simpson index of diversity (Simpson, 1949) and to machine learning theorists as
the Gini index. Jaynes discusses 1−∑ p(Hi)2 as a possible alternative information
measure (Jaynes, 2003, p. 345), but rejects it for reasons I will explain later. The
diagnosis of the present paper is that both −∑ p(Hi) log p(Hi) and 1 −∑ p(Hi)2
are appropriate information measures, but that the two measures should be used in
different contexts: −∑ p(Hi) log p(Hi) is appropriate in a learning situation, but in
a decision situation 1−∑ p(Hi)2 is more appropriate.
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7 Two Goal-Relative Non-Informative Priors
The general definition provided in (6.4) gives us a way of selecting maximally non-
informative priors. More precisely, given some confirmation measure, a probability
function that maximizes (6.4) is a natural candidate for a prior that is maximally
non-opinionated. Both (6.5) and (6.6) are maximized by a single prior – namely the
flat prior – so if the hypothesis space is finite, whether you use the log-ratio or the
difference measure as the confirmation measure in (6.4) will not make a difference to
the non-informative prior you select. In the next section, I consider what happens
when (6.5) and (6.6) are maximized relative to constraints; it turns out they can then
yield different priors, and so the confirmation measure you use makes a difference
when you have background information.
However, if the hypothesis space is continuous, the confirmation measure you use
makes a difference even if the maximization is not relative to any constrains. For
concreteness, let us consider the problem of estimating the bias θ of a coin given n
coin flips. In other words, the problem is to estimate the parameter θ in the binomial
distribution. Then we have:24
The lr non-informative prior. Given the problem of estimating the parameter θ
of a binomial distribution, the maximally non-informative prior density function that
corresponds to the log-ratio measure is
NonInflr(θ) =
1√
θ(1− θ) (7.1)
24For reasons of space, I’m omitting the proof. However, a proof can be found in Bernardo
(1979b).
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The above prior is known as “the Jeffreys prior” after its discoverer, Harold
Jeffreys (1946). We also have:25
The d non-informative prior. Given the problem of estimating the parameter θ of
a binomial distribution, the maximally non-informative prior density function that
corresponds to the difference measure is
NonInfd(θ) = 1 (7.2)
The main take-away message here is that the goals you have influence which
non-informative prior it is rational for you to have. Or to put the point differently:
whether a probability function is “completely non-informative” or opinionated de-
pends on the context. The Jeffreys prior can justifiably be regarded as maximally
non-informative in a learning situation, but in a decision situation it is opinionated.
The reverse is true for the flat prior, which is maximally non-informative in a decision
situation, but opinionated in a learning situation.
8 Goal-Relative Priors Given Objective Background
Information
As noted earlier, the information measures −∑ p(Hi) log p(Hi) and 1 −∑ p(Hi)2
are both uniquely maximized by the flat prior. However, if we have background
information available, it is reasonable to maximize the two information measures
25For reasons of space, I again omit the proof. Unfortunately, I’m not aware of any reference
where a proof may be found. However, the proof is straightforward.
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relative to that background information. This is the procedure recommended by the
objective Bayesians Jaynes (2003) and Williamson (2010), for example.26
If (6.5) and (6.6) are maximized relative to background information, they will in
general not be maximized by the same priors. As a simple illustration, consider again
the example provided in the introduction.27 The example was as follows: suppose
you are about to roll a six-sided die and you want a probability distribution p(X) over
the possible outcomes X = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. I have rolled the die many times already,
and I tell you that – on average – the die has landed on 5. Let’s first formalize the
information that I give you. The natural way for you to formalize that the die has
landed on 5 on average is to demand that the expected value of the die roll according
to your prior should be 5. In other words, you should require that
∑6
i=1Xip(Xi) = 5.
The additional constraints are, of course, that
∑
i p(Xi) = 1 and that p(Xi) ≥ 0 for
each Xi since probabilities must be non-negative and add up to 1.
If you maximize −∑ p(Hi) log p(Hi) relative to all of the above three constraints,
you end up with the probability distribution summarized in the following table:28
26How are we to understand the learning of “background information”? This is a deep ques-
tion that I do not have the space to discuss here. But, very briefly, the learning of background
information cannot be the result of conditionalizing because conditionalizing requires that there
already be a prior, but background information is supposed to be a constraint that is used in the
construction of the prior and must therefore be “prior to the prior.” For a discussion of these issues,
see Williamson (2010).
27Again, this admittedly artificial example is structurally similar to many real examples.
28I have omitted the very tedious calculation.
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Die Probability
1 0.02053
2 0.03853
3 0.07232
4 0.13574
5 0.25475
6 0.47812
The distribution that maximizes 1−∑ p(Hi)2, on the other hand, is as follows:29
Die Probability
1 0
2 0
3 0.1
4 0.2
5 0.3
6 0.4
Perhaps the most striking difference between the two tables is the fact that the
second table has zeros in it whereas the first table does not.30 This is not incidental to
this example: whereas the prior that maximizes −∑ p(Hi) log p(Hi) will never assign
a probability of 0 to any hypothesis unless background information logically excludes
the hypothesis, the prior that maximizes 1 −∑ p(Hi)2 sometimes does assign 0 to
29I have again omitted the tedious calculation.
30Another thing that may strike the reader is how nice the numbers look in the second table;
however, that is incidental to this specific example and will not happen in general.
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hypotheses. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that Jaynes rejects 1 −∑ p(Hi)2
as a measure of non-informativeness, because he does not think that any hypothesis
should ever be assigned a probability of 0 unless the hypothesis is logically excluded
(Jaynes, 2003, p. 346).
The requirement that a prior never assign 0 to any outcome or hypothesis is
reasonable in the learning situation. After all, the goal in the learning situation is
to learn the truth, and if you assign probabilities of 0 to hypotheses, you run the
risk of assigning a probability of 0 to the truth, which would ruin your chances of
learning what the truth is. However, in the decision situation, the requirement that
every hypothesis receive a non-zero probability is unmotivated. After all, the goal
in the decision situation is not to learn the truth; therefore, accidentally assigning
a probability of 0 to the truth is not necessarily a bad thing. Thus, the learning
situation is inherently a more “risk-averse” setting than the decision situation, and
this is reflected in the fact that 1−∑ p(Hi)2 is maximized by “riskier” priors than
the priors that maximize −∑ p(Hi) log p(Hi).
The reader may object that assigning a probability of 0 to a hypothesis implies
that you would be willing to accept absurd bets. For example, assigning a probability
of 0 to H apparently implies that you would be willing to pay USD 1,000,000,000
for a bet that pays 1 cent if H is false. That does not seem rational. However,
this objection implicitly assumes that every probability is a betting probability. But
this assumption begs the question against the arguments made in this paper. In
fact, as soon as I offer you a bet over a partition of hypotheses, your goal becomes
to identify which hypothesis in the partition is true. In other words, you enter
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the learning situation with respect to that partition. However, according to the
arguments presented here, you should only ever assign 0 to a hypothesis if you are
in the decision situation, i.e. if you do not care about which of the hypotheses is
true, but rather aim to use the hypotheses as a predictive tool in order to predict
something else. We may call the probabilities you assign to hypotheses in the decision
situation “predictive probabilities”; thus, the predictive probability you assign to Hi
reflects how much trust you put in Hi’s prediction. Crucially, you can have trust in
the predictions of a hypothesis, even if you know that the hypothesis is false. On the
other hand, your betting probability in Hi reflects the bets you would be willing to
accept on the truth of Hi. Clearly you would not be willing to accept any bets on a
hypothesis you know to be false; your betting probability in a hypothesis you know
to be false is 0 or close to 0. Hence, predictive probabilities and betting probabilities
are very different. In general, you should not use predictive probabilities as your
betting probabilities.31
9 Wider Implications for Bayesianism
The arguments in the preceding sections have important upshots for both objective
and subjective Bayesians, as I hope to make clear in the following two subsections.
31I thank a referee for pressing me to be clearer in this paragraph.
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9.1 Upshots for Objective Bayesianism
According to most versions of objective Bayesianism, a probability function is ratio-
nal for an agent if and only if the probability distribution is maximally uninformative
while still being consistent with the agent’s background information. Because most
objective Bayesians have assumed that there is only one correct way of measuring
the informativeness of a probability function, most objective Bayesians have ac-
cepted the Uniqueness Thesis (see Feldman (2007) and White (2005)). According to
the Uniqueness Thesis (applied to the case of prior probability functions), given any
body of background information, there is a unique rational prior probability func-
tion. However, if the arguments presented in this paper are sound, the Uniqueness
Thesis, as stated, is clearly false and can only be salvaged if it is relativized to goals.
Thus, a version of the Uniqueness Thesis consistent with the arguments presented
in this paper is as follows: given any body of background information, and given a
fixed goal, there is a uniquely rational prior probability function.
However, modifying the Uniqueness Thesis in this way makes apparent the second
consequence for objective Bayesians: if the arguments that have been presented
are sound, then objective Bayesians must apparently admit that pragmatic factors
systematically influence which prior it is rational to use.
9.2 Upshots for Subjective Bayesianism
Whereas the upshots for objective Bayesians are, I think, relatively clear, the up-
shots for subjective Bayesians are likely to be more controversial. In contrast to
objective Bayesians, subjective Bayesians do not think there are substantial rational
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requirements that agents’ probability distributions need to satisfy. Rather, an agent’s
probability distribution is supposed to accurately reflect the agent’s epistemic state.
Hence, for subjective Bayesians, the construction of a prior is not a search for the
rationally ideal prior probability function; instead, it is the search for a probability
distribution that will faithfully capture the agent’s actual opinions. Since agents
do not literally have probability functions in their heads, the epistemic state of the
agent must somehow be translated into a probability function, either by the agent
herself or by others. But how this translation exercise is to be solved will in general
depend on the goals of the agent.
This is perhaps most easily seen in cases where you want to represent probabilis-
tically a lack of opinion. Suppose, for example, that you are trying to determine
which probability distribution most faithfully represents your opinions regarding the
bias of some coin, and suppose, moreover, that you consider yourself completely un-
informed and unopinionated, so that you would like your probability distribution
over the possible biases of the coin to reflect your lack of an opinion. According to
the calculation in Section 7, the probability distribution that is maximally unopin-
ionated and that therefore most accurately reflects your epistemic state is relative to
whether you are in the learning situation or the decision situation. If you are in the
learning situation, the Jeffreys prior is the most faithful probabilistic representation
of your lack of an opinion, but if you are in the decision situation, the flat prior more
faithfully represents your epistemic state.
Of course, it is possible that you are in both the learning situation and in the
decision situation simultaneously with respect to a single partition of hypotheses.
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In that case, both probability distributions will be accurate representations of your
epistemic state, but the two probability distributions should be used for different pur-
poses. The predictive probability distribution – appropriate in the decision situation
– should be used and updated (given evidence) whenever your goal is to use the par-
tition of hypotheses to predict the future. But the learning probability distribution
should be used and updated (given evidence) when you are interested in identifying
the true hypothesis in the partition. If you have both goals at the same time, both
probability distributions should be used. Note that your epistemic state is the same
in both situations – you are completely unopinionated. But how you should best
represent your lack of an opinion over the set of hypotheses probabilistically depends
on why you care about the set of hypotheses.
More generally, suppose you consider yourself both epistemically risk-averse and
empirically-minded and that you therefore want your epistemic state to be as unopin-
ionated as possible given objective background information, such as, e.g., publicly
available frequency data. Naturally, you will want your probability distribution to
accurately reflect your epistemic risk-averseness. According to the results in Sec-
tion 6, you will need to take into account your goals when you are deciding how
to translate your epistemic state into a probability distribution, because whether a
probability distribution counts as unopinionated given background information can
only be determined once a goal has been specified. Thus the upshots we saw for
objective Bayesians also carry over to at least some agents, namely those agents who
see themselves as epistemically risk-averse.
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10 Conclusion
I will end by briefly summarizing what I take to be the main novel contributions
and conclusions of the paper. First, I have argued that the decision situation and
the learning situation require different confirmation measures in order to accurately
quantify the informational impact that a piece of evidence has on the probability of
a hypothesis. Thus, I have argued for a version of “confirmation measure pluralism.”
Second, I have shown how various information measures may reasonably be derived
from confirmation measures, and I have shown that how opinionated a probability
distribution is for an agent therefore depends on whether the agent is in the decision
situation or in the learning situation. Thus, I have also argued for a kind of “infor-
mation measure pluralism.” Finally, I have argued that the goal-relative nature of
information has important upshots for both objective and subjective Bayesians. Most
importantly, objective Bayesians must concede that whether a probability distribu-
tion is rational is partly determined by pragmatic factors, and subjective Bayesians
must similarly concede that pragmatic factors sometimes partly determine which
probability distribution most accurately represents an agent’s epistemic state.
A Derivations of (6.5) and (6.6)
The first goal is to show that Inf lr(p) = −
∑
p(Hi) log p(Hi) under the condition that
the posterior mass converges on some Hi as n → ∞, for any imagined sequence En
of evidence. In other words, for any En, we require that there exists an Hi such that
limn→∞ P (Hi|En) = 1. To avoid clutter, I will suppress n in the notation henceforth.
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Now, definition (6.4) with c = lr yields,
Inf lr(p) = lim
n→∞
∑
E
∑
i
log
p(Hi|E)
p(Hi)
p(Hi, E) (A.1)
= lim
n→∞
∑
E
∑
i
log p(Hi|E)p(H|E)p(E)− lim
n→∞
∑
E
∑
i
log p(Hi)p(Hi, E) (A.2)
=
∑
i
lim
n→∞
∑
E
p(E)log p(Hi|E)p(H|E)−
∑
i
log p(Hi)p(Hi) (A.3)
For each term of the form p(E)log p(Hi|E)p(H|E), by assumption, either p(Hi|E)→
1 as n → ∞, in which case p(E)log p(Hi|E)p(Hi|E) → 0; or else p(Hi|E) → 0, in
which case p(E)log p(Hi|E)p(Hi|E)→ 0 again.32 Thus,
Inf lr(p) = −
∑
i
log p(Hi)p(Hi) (A.4)
Which was the first thing to be proven. Note that no assumptions were made
about the sequence of evidence in the above derivation. This shows that the deriva-
tion does not depend on any such assumptions.
Now suppose that we instead plug c = d into definition (6.4). Then the calculation
becomes:
32This latter limit can be shown by an application of l’Hopital’s rule.
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Infd(p) = lim
n→∞
∑
E
∑
i
[
p(Hi|E)− p(Hi)
]
p(Hi, E) (A.5)
= lim
n→∞
∑
E
∑
i
p(Hi|E)p(Hi, E)− lim
n→∞
∑
E
∑
i
p(Hi)p(Hi, E) (A.6)
= lim
n→∞
∑
E
∑
i
p(Hi|E)2p(E)−
∑
i
p(Hi)
2 (A.7)
(A.8)
By assumption, there is a unique term of the sum
∑
i p(Hi|E)2 such that p(Hi|E)→
1 as n→∞; moreover, for all of the other members of the sum, p(Hi|E)→ 0. There-
fore, as n→∞, the entire sum ∑i p(Hi|E)2 converges to 1. Consequently,
Infd(p) = lim
n→∞
∑
E
p(E)−
∑
i
p(Hi)
2 (A.9)
= 1−
∑
i
p(Hi)
2 (A.10)
(A.11)
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